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Abstract 
This paper attempts to provide a discussion on the ways in which price discrimination affects economic 
efficiency. The main proposition of competition policy is that perfect competitive markets are efficient and hence 
price discrimination is harmful. The study reviews the conceptual and theoretical views to identify the different 
effects of different types of price discrimination on social welfare. The study illustrates how incumbent firms can 
act to undermine competition in monopolistic market. The study further reveals that price discrimination may be 
seen as a precondition for efficient pricing and can lead firms to leave consumers with or without surplus than 
they would enjoy in its absence.  
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1. Introduction 
The main proposition of competit ion policy is the notion of the perfect competitive market is efficient. 
Imperfect ions are observed feature of the real world markets. Firms in most markets often find it profitable to 
segment consumers according to their demand elasticity and tend to price discriminate. Theoretically, Price 
discrimination applies to imperfectly competit ive market but in a perfectly  competitive market, firms lack power 
neither in the short nor in the long run to charge different prices. 
In evaluating the impact of price discrimination in imperfect market environments, two associated comparisons 
are relevant for public policy:  first, the welfare effect of price discrimination, that is, what is the welfare 
implications from allowing firms to price discriminate? Second, price discrimination and competition, that is, 
what are the effects of price discrimination on competition? The essay is divided into four sections. The second 
section describes some concepts. In the third section, we discuss the theoretical positions about the welfare effect  
of price discrimination; the third section analyses the effects of price discrimination on competit ion and the final 
section is the conclusion.  
 
2. Conceptual issues  
Price discrimination– Price discrimination is to charge buyers different prices for similar products with the same 
marg inal cost of production.  The rational for firms to price d iscriminate is that some buyers are willing to pay 
more for a g iven product or services. Th is is only  feasible when the fo llowing condit ions can be satisfied: (i) 
customers can be segmented (ii) no arbitrage opportunities, that is buying in low-priced market and reselling in  
the high-priced market is infeasible. (iii) The elasticity of demand in each market must also be different so that 
the firm will charge a high price in the market where demand is less elastic, and less sensitive to price rise and 
vice versa.   
In order to study the effects of price discrimination economists traditionally have classified price discrimination 
into three basic forms: (i)  first-degree or perfect price discrimination – under first-degree (perfect) price 
discrimination, the seller captures all the Profits (consumer surplus) by charging each consumer’s individual 
price just equal to the maximum price that consumers would  be willing to pay. (ii) Second-degree price 
discrimination – under second-degree price discrimination the seller sets different prices such as, discount for 
bulk purchases, peak/off-peak or high/low peak period prices. (iii) Third-degree price discrimination – refers to 
when the seller offers different prices according to consumers’ characteristics. For example, children, elderly  
students to pay less. 
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3. Discussions  
3.1 Effects perfect price discrimination on social welfare under 
There is no doubt about the welfare effects of first-degree price d iscrimination where the monopolist has perfect 
knowledge about each consumer’s preservation price. The monopolist charges each customer accord ing to his or 
her reservation price. That is, the monopolist supplies all consumers whose reservation price exceeds the 
monopolist marg inal costs. This pricing policy allows the monopolist to convert the entire consumer surplus that 
exists in the non-discrimination case into producer’s supernormal p rofits. Of course, the distribution of income 
might be less acceptable, but that is not an efficiency issue, it is an issue of fairness but the outcome is more 
efficient than in  the uniform price setting because, the same welfare would be attained under Bertrand or perfect  
competition. In order to explain this, the following comparison is helpful: 
• Without discrimination- if a firm is not allowed (or not possible) to price d iscriminate, the firm will set a 
single price to maximize profit, obviously, the chosen price will be above cost, and total surplus is not 
maximized. The problem is that only those whose maximum willingness to pay are above cost are 
served (even though it is efficient to serve all those whose willingness to pay are above or equal to 
marginal cost).  
• With-discrimination- If a firm is permitted to discriminate, it will be possible (i.e. if the firm can  
somehow observe each consumer’s preservation price) fo r a firm to charge each consumer the 
maximum possible (p rice equals marginal cost). This illustration seems utopia and should not be 
overemphasized, as it is difficult for firms to have full knowledge of consumers’ preferences.  
  
3.2 Effects of second-degree price discrimination on welfare 
Second-degree price discrimination can also be welfare improving. For instance in a two-part tariff, consumers 
are required to pay a flat fee independent of the number of units purchased plus a variable port ion which depends 
on the quantity of goods bought. In this case, though the firm charges a lower marg inal p rice than the price under 
non-discrimination but will use the flat fee to ext ract surplus from consumers with lower amount of demand. The 
outcome is analogous to the first-degree described above but is less extreme than the latter because, the lower 
marg inal price decreases the efficiency loss and thus improves welfare. (The flat fee compensates the lower 
marginal price). 
 
3.3 Effects of third-degree price discrimination on welfare 
The welfare effect of third degree p rice discrimination is ambiguous in general. If group-pricing leads to opening 
up of markets that would otherwise not been served at all, then there is potential welfare improvement. For 
example, if discrimination is allowed, suppose the size o f the high-value market is sufficiently  large compared to 
lower-value market, the firm can set a h igher price in  the high-value market and lower price in  the low-value 
market but when d iscrimination is not permitted the firm will choose to serve the market with high-value only. In  
such cases, price discrimination results in a Pareto improvement: the high-value market’s price is unchanged 
while the low-value market too is served, thus increases the surplus of consumers in the weak market as well as 
the firm’s profit. 
 
3.4 Price discrimination and competition  
Price discriminat ion can act to lessen competitive pressure in a market in  many ways at the detriment consumers. 
As illustrated in (Armstrong, 2006) when a multi-product firm faces a single-product rival, it is likely that 
bundling can act to reduce the intensity of competit ion.  For example, there are two firms (A and B) and two  
products (X and Y) in  the market: firm ‘A’ produces both goods while Firm ‘B’ can  only produce the second 
Product. Also, suppose, both firms offer same version of the second product. It is also assumed that firms’ 
production costs are normalized to zero.           
If consumers placed different values to both products, if firm ‘A’ the multi-product firm sets unbundled prices for 
its products and it will set the monopoly price which is equal to one in its “captive” market. A ll profits are 
competed away for the second product, and that product’s price is zero. Therefore, in case of unbundled pricing 
Firm A will get a profit while firm B gets nothing. When firm A adopts to bundle its products together, prior to 
the firms choosing prices, firm ‘A’ set a price for its bundled product while firm B set a price for its product. As a 
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result, bundling helps to distinguish the two firms’ offerings: firm ‘A’ has a better offer because of its additional 
product in the bundle. We also find that the profits of both firms are higher when compared to a situation where 
firm ‘A’ prices its products separately. Thus, the effect of bundling on a multi-product firm’s incentive to be 
aggressive to single-product rival is found to be ambiguous and that without a detailed data on consumer 
preferences, it  is somehow d ifficult  for an  anti-trust authority to predict a  priori the impact  of bundling on 
competition. 
Another way in which price discrimination might relax competit ion is Price-matching contracts. This is a 
situation when a firm promises buyers to match a lesser price charge by a rival firm if they can search for such a 
price. Th is kind of contracts is considered as price discrimination implying that the price a consumer pays for a 
product differs to other firms' prices based on their knowledge of the market condition and their willingness to 
search and to provide evidence of a lower price. Supposing, consumers have a complete knowledge about all 
rivals’ prices and there are no transaction costs involved in  documenting the lower prices, there is a clear chance 
of collusion. That is, the incentive for one firm to undercut another is not there since the low-priced firm will not 
get greater market share and will only lower its prices and that of its rivals. In  this kind of framework, the policy  
that prohibits such kind  of d iscriminatory practice would help  restore competition in the market to the benefit  of 
consumers. However, in a situation where such efforts of searching for prices and providing of the price offers 
involve costs, then there is a tendency for emergence of more conventional price d iscrimination because of the 
categorization of buyers based on their value of time. In this case, the co llusive impact of “competitor-based” 
discrimination is dulled and consumers might be better off sometimes with this type of price discrimination.  
Another important way in which p rice discrimination might act to relax competit ion arises when it  leads to 
negative network effects. This externality is apparent in the telecommunications market where customers 
subscribe to a particular network based on the destination network. Th is type of discrimination is present, if a  
subscriber on a particular network faces a different call charge when he calls another subscriber on the same 
network or to a subscriber on a rival network. For example, if a leading firm in the telecommunication industry 
makes it  expensive to make calls to people on rival networks than on their own network. This would have 
negative consequences for customers as a result of consumption externalit ies as a number of other indiv iduals 
using the compatible or similar product affects the utility derived from consumption of services in the network 
industry. For example, a subscriber prefers to subscribe or join  a particular network that gives him much benefit  
in terms of much  number of contacts on that network, in order to make a greater fract ion of their calls at the low-
priced rates. Therefore, market with this kind of network externality will not be competitive, since newcomers 
find it difficu lt to attract new subscribers even with more favourable offers. Therefore, this form of price 
discrimination can act to limit competitive pressures to the detriment of consumers. 
 
3.5 Effects of price discrimination on entry 
The fundamental concern of competit ion policy on price discrimination is its effects on entry, because entries can 
be regarded as an equilibrat ing force; ensuing in normal profits and allocative efficiency. The effect of price 
discrimination on the number firms in a monopolistic market is that, it can increase or decrease profits in a 
market with a given number of firms. When there is free entry into the market the equilibrium number of firms  
will be larger but with price discrimination falls as the competition becomes tense the stronger firms will drive 
out the weaker ones. It is clear that free entry will result in too many firms entering from a total welfare 
perspective. In those cases where price discrimination raises profits, the resulting greater entry will only  
exacerbate the welfare costs of excessive entry. On the other hand, when price d iscrimination destroys profits, 
the excess entry problem will be seized to exist. 
Another controversial aspect of price discrimination is the possible impact on the incumbent’s ability to undercut 
prices as a strategy to prevent potential firms from entry. There are various ways in which price discrimination 
by an incumbent firm affects the incentives to enter its markets. Consider a case when an incumbent firm (mult i-
market) facing potential entry into one of its markets, if the incumbent is allowed  to set different prices in its two 
markets, then it is expected that it will react more aggressively to entry than when it  is not permitted (same price 
is set in both the competitive and the captive market). In the former case, the post-entry profit of the entrant is 
likely to be lower than in the latter when it cannot price discriminate. The potential firm will enter only  if its 
expected profit covers its entry costs. There are cases to consider here. If the cost of entry is large, there will be 
no entry whether the incumbent can undercut price or not. In this case, the social desirability of price 
discrimination is exactly  as in  the standard monopoly case, and this is ambiguous in general. Likewise, if the 
entry cost is very small, entry will take place in spite of policy towards price discrimination.  
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The interesting issue is when the entry is profitable but only  if the incumbent cannot price discriminates, so that 
a policy prohibiting price d iscrimination can induce entry. In such cases policy disallowing price discrimination 
is reasonable as this will bring in the entrant and increase competition. Also disallowing an incumbent the right 
to meet the price of a rival on a basis of price d iscrimination provides some protection against price assault to the 
entrant.   While, the effect of banning price d iscrimination tends to weaken competition if the competitor is 
already in the market, but when the case of incentives are considered then the effect might be pro-competitive. 
However, as per welfare effects of prohibiting price discrimination in this context are not clear.      
 
4. Conclusion 
Generally, from the economic perspective, there is no clear-cut evidence that price discrimination has a 
deleterious effect on social welfare.  However, price discrimination may be seen as a precondition for efficient 
pricing and can lead to more intense competition that benefits consumers. Price discrimination can also lead 
firms to leave consumers with no or less surplus than they would enjoy in its absence. The possibility of an 
incumbent firm to engage in price d iscrimination will typically have a d iscouraging effect on entry. It requires 
detailed information to decide when price d iscrimination is likely to be welfare improving or decreasing. Clearly, 
there are many instances where such price discrimination harms welfare and consumers, but given the amount of 
informat ion required to decide on this, and given that rule against excessive pricing remain present in some 
jurisdictions for use with particularly egregious cases, it seems reasonable to give firms the benefit of the doubt. 
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